This post is an excerpt and summary of U.S. Congressinoal Research Service report R42136. I put my own comments in the lines to show how stupid the United Statesd Department of Defense is, and will be.
Unmanned aerial systems comprise a rapidly growing portion of the military budget, and have been a long-term interest of Congress. At times, Congress has encouraged the development of such systems; in other instances, it has attempted to rein in or better organize the Department of Defense’s efforts.
WHAT, HOW AND WHY ARE THE TOP 3 QUESTIONS EVERY UAS MANUFACTURER SHOULD ASK HERSELF.
No money, no UAS. That’s it.
- Why does the Military Want UAS?
- What Missions Do UAS Currently Perform?
- What Other Missions Might UAS Undertake in the Future?
- Why Are There So Many Different UAS?
- Does the Department of Defense Have an Integrated UAS Development Policy?
- UAS Management Issues
- UAS and Investment Priorities
- Duplication of Capability
- Other Potential Missions
- Recruitment and Retention
- Industrial Base Considerations
- Congressional Considerations
- Current Major DOD UAS Programs
- Other Current UAS Programs
Unmanned aircraft are commonly called unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and when combined with ground control stations and data links, form UAS, or unmanned aerial systems.
Full automation, it’s still a dream. (My friends are talking about salary and social security now, it’s a joke in my company, namely, Shaoyang Sunshine. LOL.)
UAVs range from the size of an insect to that of a commercial airliner. DOD currently possesses five UAVs in large numbers: the Air Force’s Predator, Reaper, and Global Hawk; and the Army’s Hunter and Shadow. Other key UAV developmental efforts include the Air Force’s RQ-170 Sentinel; the Navy’s Unmanned Carrier-Launched Airborne Surveillance and Strike (UCLASS), MQ-8 Fire Scout, and Broad Area Maritime Surveillance (BAMS) UAV; and the Marine Corps’s Small Tactical Unmanned Aerial System.
However, reflecting the growing awareness and support in Congress and the Department of Defense for UAS, investments in unmanned aerial vehicles have been increasing every year. DOD spending on UAS has increased from $284 million in FY2000 to $3.3 billion in FY2010.
UAVs are either described as a single air vehicle (with associated surveillance sensors), or a UAV system (UAS), which usually consists of three to six air vehicles, a ground control station, and support equipment.
UAS may also be cheaper to procure and operate than manned aircraft. However, the lower procurement cost of UAS can be weighed against their greater proclivity to crash, while the minimized risk to onboard crew can be weighed against the complications and hazards inherent in flying unmanned vehicles in airspace shared with manned assets.
UAS use has increased for a number of reasons. Advanced navigation and communications technologies were not available just a few years ago, and increases in military communications satellite bandwidth have made remote operation of UAS more practical. The nature of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars has also increased the demand for UAS, as identification of and strikes against targets hiding among civilian populations required persistent surveillance and prompt strike capability, to minimize collateral damage. Further, UAS provide an asymmetrical—and comparatively invulnerable—technical advantage in these conflicts.
Why does the Military Want UAS?
In today’s military, unmanned systems are highly desired by combatant commanders for their versatility and persistence. By performing tasks such as surveillance; signals intelligence (SIGINT); precision target designation; mine detection; and chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear (CBRN) reconnaissance, unmanned systems have made key contributions to the Global War on Terror.
What kind of terror. Who are the terrorists. And how to fight against Terror.
As a result, “The number of platforms in this category—R/MQ-4 Global Hawk-class, MQ-9 Reaper, and MQ-1 Predator-class unmanned aircraft systems (UAS)—will grow from approximately 340 in FY 2012 to approximately 650 in FY 2021.”
Unmanned aircraft systems are usually less expensive than manned aircraft. Initial concepts envisioned very low-cost, essentially expendable aircraft. As of 2011, however, whether substantially lower costs will be realized is unclear. Although a pilot may not be on board, the advanced sensors carried by unmanned aircraft systems are very expensive and cannot be viewed as expendable…. Moreover, excessively high losses of aircraft can negate cost advantages by requiring the services to purchase large numbers of replacement aircraft.
With the advancement of new tech, these initial concepts may be practical, but not in the United States. China I guess. 所以现在的无 人机（大中小型都适用）也很符合这样一句话，理想很丰满，现实很骨感。
What Missions Do UAS Currently Perform?
What Other Missions Might UAS Undertake in the Future?
Resupply. The Navy is investigating how UAS could deliver cargo to ships at sea.
Combat Search and Rescue. Early research is underway to develop the capability for an unmanned system to locate and possibly evacuate personnel behind enemy lines.
Air Combat. While this operational encounter may be a “baby step” on the way toward an aerial combat capability, newer UAS such as the X-47B, Avenger, and Phantom Ray are not being designed with acknowledged air-to-air capability.
Why Are There So Many Different UAS?
Although UAS have a long history, only in the last 10-15 years have advances in navigation, communications, materials, and other technologies made a variety of current UAS missions possible. UAS are therefore still in a period of innovation, both in their design and how they are operated. This can be seen as analogous to military aircraft in the 1930s and 1940s, when technologies and doctrines evolved at a rapid rate to exploit the new technology, and also to the early Jet Age, when the military acquired many different models of aircraft with varying capabilities before settling on a force made up of large numbers of relatively few models based on lessons learned.
Does the Department of Defense Have an Integrated UAS Development Policy?
DOD also issues a biannual roadmap indicating what technologies and capabilities it expects to see in future systems, and attempting to project the requirements for broad UAS capabilities 25 years into the future. Development of UAS is still carried out by individual military services.
A significant congressional boost to UAS acquisition came in the conference report for the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2001, which expressed Congress’s desire that “within ten years, one-third of U.S. military operational deep strike aircraft will be unmanned.” 31 This goal was seen at the time as very challenging, because DOD had no unmanned deep strike aircraft.
Unfortunately, the U.S. military failed. Subsequently, the Fiscal 2007 Defense Authorization Act required the Secretary of Defense to “develop a policy, to be applicable throughout the Department of Defense, on research, development, test and evaluation, procurement, and operation of unmanned systems.” The policy was required to include, among other elements, “A preference for unmanned systems in acquisition programs for new systems, including a requirement under any such program for the development of a manned system for a certification that an unmanned system is incapable of meeting program requirements.” Thus, Congress changed the default assumption of new systems; instead of seeking unmanned systems to accomplish the same tasks as manned equivalents, unmanned systems would be developed to accomplish military tasks unless there was some need that the systems be manned.
无人机的确是无人机，但并不是万能机啊。可预见的未来空战主力肯定还是有 人的战斗机。只不过随着人工智能技术的真正意义上的发展，更加强大， 真正智能的无人机势必会登上空战舞台。并且，对实时通信、大带宽的要求也 只会越来越高。所以上面这一段话废话这么多，用一句俗语概括叫做，“退而 求其次”。
UAS Management Issues
This leads many to call for centralization of UAS acquisition authority, to ensure unity of effort and inhibit wasteful duplication. On the other hand, if UAS efforts are too centralized, some fear that competition and innovation may be repressed.
Cost Management Issues
Once viewed as a cheap alternative to manned aircraft, or even a “poor man’s air force,” some UAS are beginning to rival manned aircraft in cost. According to DOD’s most recent estimate, the Global Hawk program will cost $13.9 billion to purchase 66 aircraft; a program acquisition unit cost of $211 million per UAV. 33 The program has twice triggered Nunn-McCurdy breaches, which require DOD to notify Congress when cost growth on a major acquisition program reaches 15%. In 2005, development cost overruns led to an average unit cost growth of 18% per airframe and prompted appropriators to voice their concern (H.R. 2863, H.Rept. 109-119, p. 174). In April 2011, a reduction in the number of Global Hawk Block 40 aircraft requested in the FY2012 budget from 22 to 11 caused overall Global Hawk unit prices to increase by 11%, again triggering Nunn-McCurdy.
“Once viewed”, 谁他妈没有傻逼的时候呢。翻了错误了不要紧，成本上来了 不要紧，产品质量跟性能跟上来就好。就怕没跟上来还越卖越贵。这在很多行 业都是真理。on a path to being unaffordable
UAS and Investment Priorities
As part of its defense oversight role, Congress is positioned to arbitrate between competing UAS investments, or impact DOD’s overarching investment plan. Several relevant questions seem apparent: How is UAS cost quantified? What is the most effective balance in spending between UAS and manned aircraft? How should DOD, Congress, and the UAS manufacturers balance cost with apability? Finally, what areas of investment are the most important to maximize UAS capabilities?
好钢用在刀刃上。Human have always been greedy.
When compared to other aircraft, the cost of an individual remotely piloted vehicle can be misleading. UAVs operate as part of a system, which generally consists of a ground control station, a ground crew including remote pilots and sensor operators, communication links, and often multiple air vehicles. Unlike a manned aircraft such as an F-16, these supporting elements are a requisite for the vehicle’s flight. Consequently, analysts comparing UAV costs to manned aircraft may need to consider the cost of the supporting elements and operational infrastructure that make up the complete unmanned aviation system.
无人机，无人机。想要做到真正的中等（我就不说强人工智能了，那一天人类 基本上也可以自我灭绝了）意义人工智能，还有非常漫长的路要走。计算机科 学之所以在这个世纪有立足之地，能够忽悠到这么多经费，不外乎于在人工智 能里里外外做文章。
Once an adequate and uniform cost comparison mechanism or definition has been established, the next step for Congress may be to identify an appropriate balance in spending between UAS and manned aircraft. If the upward trend in UAS funding continues through 2013, as shown in Figure 3, DOD is projected to have spent upwards of $26 billion on procurement, RDT&E, operations, and maintenance for UAS from 2001-2013. This number far exceeds the $3.9 billion spent on UAS from 1988-2000.
Cost savings have long been touted by UAS advocates as one of the advantages offered by unmanned aircraft over manned aircraft. However, critics point out that the acquisition cost savings are often negligible if one considers that money saved by not having a pilot in the cockpit must be applied to the “ground cockpit” of the UAS aircrew operating the UAV from the ground control station. Another cost question concerns personnel. Do UAS “pilots” cost less to train and keep proficient than pilots of manned aircraft? So although the air vehicle might be cheaper than a manned aircraft, the UAV system as a whole is not always less expensive. Additionally, UAS have a higher attrition rate and lower reliability rate than manned aircraft, which means that the operation and maintenance costs can be higher. On the other hand, UAS ground control stations are capable of simultaneously flying multiple UAVs, somewhat restoring the advantage in cost to the unmanned system. Congress has noted that, “while the acquisition per unit cost may be relatively small, in the aggregate, the acquisition cost rivals the investment in other larger weapon systems.”
A second approach advocates fielding fewer, more expensive, and more capable UAVs that are less networked with other systems, such as the autonomous Global Hawk. The Global Hawk serves as a high altitude, “all-in-one” surveillance platform capable of staying aloft for days at a time, yet does not operate in concert with any of its fellow UAV peers. Since 2003, programs at both ends of this spectrum have experienced delays and a reduction in funding.
Finally, what areas of investment will yield the maximum effectiveness out of these UAS? Four specific issues stand out as the most pressing: interoperability, reliability, force multiplication/autonomy, and engine systems.
协同作战？错！不同军种，不同机型的兼容性。可靠性：你看美利坚再有钱也 不至于支付得起三天两头摔飞机的钱，对吧？自动化：这个无他，只能一步一 步慢慢靠【真正的技术进步】，吹牛逼救不了美利坚。发动机：这一块是中国 空军的心病，航空发动机解决不了，中国就谈不上真正的航空大国——纸老虎。
UAS development has been marked by the slow advancement of interoperability. The future plans for UAS use within the framework of larger battlefield operations and more interconnected and potentially joint-service combat systems require UAS to communicate seamlessly between each other and numerous different ground components, and to also be compatible with diverse ground control systems. The lack of interconnectivity at these levels has often complicated missions to the point of reducing their effectiveness, as Dyke Weatherington, head of DOD’s UAS planning taskforce, noted: “There have been cases where a service’s UAV, if it could have gotten data to another service, another component, it may have provided better situational awareness on a specific threat in a specific area that might have resulted in different measures being taken.
- First, DOD hopes to integrate an adequate interface for situational awareness, which will relay the objective, position, payload composition, service operator, and mission tasking procedure to other unmanned aircraft and potentially to ground elements
- Second, a payload interface will allow the coherent transfer of surveillance data.
- Third, the weapons interface will constitute a separate transfer medium by which operators can coordinate these platforms’ offensive capabilities.
- Finally, the air vehicle control interface will enable navigation and positioning from the ground with respect to other aircraft.
The members of the House Armed Services Committee included a clause that called for the requirement of all tactical unmanned aerial vehicles throughout the services to be equipped with the Tactical Common Data Link, which has become the services’ standardized communication tool for providing “critical wideband data link required for real-time situational awareness, as well as real time sensor and targeting data to tactical commanders.”
The increased use of UAS in Iraq and Afghanistan indicates that remotely piloted platforms’ mass consumption of bandwidth will require a more robust information transfer system in the coming years.
One approach to alleviating the bandwidth concern was the Transformational Satellite Communications (TSAT) project. DOD intended to use that laser and satellite communications system to provide U.S. Armed Forces with an unlimited and uninhibited ability to send and receive messages and critical information around the world without data traffic jams. However, the TSAT project was canceled in 2009. As another interim option, DOD has testified that a more autonomous UAV would require less bandwidth, since more data are processed on board and less data are being moved. However, it is unclear that autonomy will actually decrease bandwidth requirements since the transmission of data from the UAV’s sensors drives the demand for bandwidth. As an example, a single Global Hawk, already an autonomous UAV, “requires 500Mbps bandwidth—which equates to 500 percent of the total bandwidth of the entire U.S. military used during the 1991 Gulf War.”
理想很丰满，现实很骨感。这就是美利坚合众国国防部三去一降一补之后，美 国各兵种的真实战斗力写照。这个星球上，军队牛皮吹得最好的有两个国家， 美国以及西非第一大国，冈比亚。It is
unclearthat autonomy will actually decrease bandwidth requirements. LOLOLOL.
A 2010 media study reported that “Thirty-eight Predator and Reaper drones have crashed during combat missions in Afghanistan and Iraq, and nine more during training on bases in the U.S.— with each crash costing between $3.7 million and $5 million. Altogether, the Air Force says there have been 79 drone accidents costing at least $1 million each.”
In 2004 the Defense Science Board indicated that relatively high UAV mishap rates might impede the widespread fielding of UAVs. Although mostUAV accidents have been attributed to human error, 64 investment in reliability upgrades appears to be another high priority for UAS. The 2005 UAS Roadmap indicated that UAV mishap rates appeared to be much higher than the mishap rates of many manned aircraft. Table 3 shows the number of Class A Mishaps per 100,000 hours of major UAVs and comparable manned aircraft as of 2005.
In its 2004 study, the Defense Science Board (DSB) notes that manned aircraft over the past five decades have moved from a relatively high mishap rate to relatively low rates through advancements in system design, weather durability improvements, and reliability upgrades.
The DSB report also suggests that nominal upgrades and investment—arguing even that many UAS will need little change—could produce substantial reductions in the UAV mishap rates. The 2005 UAS Roadmap proposes investments into emerging technologies, such as self-repairing “smart” flight control systems, auto take-off and recovery instruments, and heavy fuel engines, to enhance reliability. Also, the incorporation of advanced materials—such as high temperature components, light-weight structures, shape memory alloys, and cold weather tolerance designs that include significant de-icing properties—will be expected to improve the survivability of UAS in adverse environments.
现在你们能理解为什么现代战争打的是信息站，更多的打的是经济战了吧？你 灭不掉我这个政权，我就用大国绞肉机阿富汗之流来拖死你。MOST UAV ACCIDENTS HUMAN ERROR—-at least part of the accidents are technical error, software and hardware. Who is to blame then? DOD? Taxpayers? 当然，你问我二八定律在无人机的研发过程中起不起作用，很明 显，还是有用的。
One of the most attractive and innovative technological priorities for UAS is to enable one ground operator to pilot several UAVs at once. Currently most UAS require at least two ground operators; one to pilot the vehicle and another to control the sensors. The end goal for UAS manufactures and users is to reduce the 2:1 operator-vehicle ratio and eventually elevate the autonomy and interoperability of UAS to the point where two or more vehicles can be controlled by one operator. If this technological feat is achieved, the advantage of UAS as a force-multiplier on the battlefield could provide a dramatic change in combat capability.
技术的进步，从大局观上面来看，还是会给人类带来幸福的。但是进步的大方 向一定不能错，不能走上唯技术论的邪路。更加精确、智能的自动化软硬件会 极大程度地提升人类的幸福指数。就好像电力在这个世纪被广泛的应用一样。
The process of achieving this goal may require significant time and investments. As the 2005 UAS Roadmap notes, “Getting groups of UA to team (or swarm) in order to accomplish an objective will require significant investment in control technologies” with specific reference to distributed control technologies. Considering the two operator system currently in place for most UAS, the logical approach to reaching this technological advancement is to first invest in the autonomous flight capabilities of the UAVs, so as to reduce the workload for the complete UAS. The Global Hawk and the Scan Eagle possess significant automated flight capabilities, but their degree of actual flight autonomy can be debated due to the UAV’s need for continuous operator intervention in poor weather conditions. The OSD quantifies the degree of UAV autonomy on a scale of 1 to 10; Table 4 shows the OSD’s Autonomous Capability Levels for UAVs.
然鹅相当多的中国重点大学自动化学院的老师们根本就不会教学，不会告诉你 《自动控制原理》的究极奥义。他们只会照本宣科而已。幸好这个年代有国际 互联网，我们可以取长补短——只要你有动力去学习，哪怕你在邵阳学院也能学 有所成。一个现实，这个世界上能造无人机的国家不要太多。然鹅造出来 的不是壳子或者玩具的国家那就凤毛麟角了。Comparative Advantages,田忌 赛马很重要。
Some key technologies that will enable future UAS include:
lightweight, long endurance battery and/or alternative power technology, effective bandwidth management/data compression tools, stealth capability and collaborative or teaming technologies that will allow UAS to operate in concert with each other and with manned aircraft. A critical enabler allowing UAS access to U.S. National and ICAO airspace will be a robust on-board sense and avoid technology. The ability of UAS to operate in airspace shared with civil manned aircraft will be critical for future peacetime training and operations. There is also a need for open architecture systems that will allow competition among many different commercial UAS and ground control systems allowing DoD to “mix and match” the best of all possible systems on the market. Technology enablers in propulsion systems coupled with greater energy efficiency of payloads are required to extend loiter time and expand the missions of UAS to include Electronic Attack and directed energy
Duplication of Capability
Congress may ask if the production of different UAS with relatively similar performance
capabilities constitutes unnecessary duplication.（
Sadly the answer
is YES). Critics of expanded UAS roles often argue that the
production of similar platforms is unnecessary, considering that a
consolidated inventory—hypothetically consisting of only the RQ-4B
Global Hawk, the RQ/MQ-1 Predator and the RQ-7 Shadow—could perform
and fulfill the same duties as the expanded inventory.
ALL IN ONE IS ALL YOU NEED. 这也是为什么现在察打一体化越来越流行了， 也能合理的解释为什么一系列杀毒软件，XX管家，XX安全卫士越做越大了。王 家卫也信奉长尾理论不是吗。
The 2011 program acquisition unit cost for the MQ-9 Reaper is $28.4 million, just over half the $55 million estimate for the F-16 Falcon. A simple payload comparison shows that the F-16 can carry approximately four times the payload of the Reaper (10,750 lbs vs. 2,500 lbs). Further, the F-16 is a versatile combat aircraft that can be used to perform many missions that the Reaper cannot. This may suggest that using manned aircraft for air-to-ground combat may generally prove more cost effective than using UAS, and that the UAS’s unique combat capabilities may be most valued in niche circumstances, such as when manned aircraft would be in extreme danger.
Made in China就是好啊就是好。兄弟们你们看，美利坚的东西这么贵，还不 一定卖给你们。我们五年十万公里的质保，还不快来买啊！买买买! Versatile combat aircraft v.s. MALE/HALE. WHO WILL WIN? 同志们，现阶 段无人侦察机、察打一体机被传统的三代甚至二代半的战斗机完爆，我们该怎 么办呢？只有加快产品性价比的完善，以及技术的更新换代。无他。
Other Potential Missions
Man V.S. Machine, who will win?
Other missions for which UAS appear useful, or are being considered in the near term, include electronic attack (also called stand-off jamming, or escort jamming), and psychological operations, such as dropping leaflets (EXO ME?!!). UAS such as the Army’s Shadow have been evaluated for their capability to deliver critical medical supplies needed on the battlefield.
While UAS use in foreign theaters is well established, one of the most commonly discussed new mission areas for UAS is homeland defense and homeland security. The Coast Guard and U.S. Border Patrol already employ UAS such as the Eagle Eye and Predator to watch coastal waters, patrol the nation’s borders, and protect major oil and gas pipelines (EVEN ELECTRICITY LINES).
It appears that interest is growing in using UAS for a variety of domestic, and often non-defense roles. Long-duration law enforcement surveillance, a task performed by manned aircraft during the October 2002 sniper incident near Washington, DC, is one example. The U.S. Department of Transportation has studied possible security roles for UAS, such as following trucks with hazardous cargo, while the Energy Department has been developing high-altitude instruments to measure radiation in the atmosphere. UAS might also be used in sparsely populated areas of the western United States to search for forest fires. Following the widespread destruction of Hurricane Katrina, some suggest that a UAS like Global Hawk could play roles in “consequence management” and relief efforts. Also, UAS advocates note that countries like South Korea and Japan have used UAS for decades for crop dusting and other agricultural purposes.
One drawback to these lighter-than-air platforms is their lack of maneuverability and speed relative to UAVs like the Global Hawk; their long persistence once on station may be somewhat offset by the time required for them to relocate in response to new taskings. Nonetheless, many major UAS manufacturers are preparing—and, in some cases, testing—lighter-than-air systems that could carry out a variety of missions for homeland security.
Space satellites offer many benefits; they are thought to be relatively invulnerable to attack, and field many advanced capabilities. However, tasking the satellites can be cumbersome, especially with competing national priorities. The limited number of systems can only serve so many customers at one time. Additionally, some satellites lack the loitering capability of UAS, only passing over the same spot on Earth about once every three days. Due to the high costs of space launches, UAVs like Global Hawk are being considered for communication relays as substitutes for low-orbiting satellite constellations.
需要多调查一下军队话语权大的国家。因为非洲这些个国家都比较年轻，所以 无论是国土安全还是国防安全，我觉得每一位领导人都不会掉以轻心。殷鉴不 远。就发射卫星这件事情来说，太空垃圾是该想想办法了，要不然现在的发展 中国家总是会起来造反的。
The Issue of Airspace
According to FAA spokesman William Shumann, the primary challenge in finding this common ground is “to develop vehicles that meet FAA safety requirements if they want to fly in crowded airspace.”
Upgrading UAS collision avoidance capabilities, often referred to as “sense and avoid” technology, appears to be a critical part in the next step of reaching the UAS-airspace common ground.
Recruitment and Retention
The defining characteristic of UAS is that they are “unmanned” or “unpiloted.” However, this may be a misnomer.
讲个笑话：无人机。我讲完了。真正哪天做到强人工智能了，家祭无忘告乃翁。 “There’s nothing unmanned about them,” [former Air Force Lt Gen David] Deptula said. It can take as many as 170 persons to launch, fly, and maintain such an aircraft as well as to process and disseminate its ISR products.
A central question related to the potential impact of increased UAS employment on personnel is “what qualifications are required to operate UAS?” Currently, the Air Force requires Predator and Global Hawk operators to be pilot-rated officers. Other services do not require that status for their UAS operators. This means that, in the other services, there is no competition between manned and unmanned aircraft for potentially scarce pilots.
摸着良心讲，培养出合格、有效的无人机驾驶员所需要的代价一点也不低。所 以在宣传无人机的采购成本这方面，应该是越来越难忽悠有识之士了。”如何 改革？” “倒逼改革。”
The Air Force maintains that their UAS are more technologically and operationally sophisticated than other UAS, and a trained pilot is required to employ these UAS most effectively. As UAS autonomy, or command and control, matures, or if personnel issues for the Air Force become more troublesome, it, or Congress, may decide to review the policy of requiring pilot-rated officers to operate UAS.
Industrial Base Considerations
Those who fear manned industrial base atrophy argue that the future of UAS is overrated, and that demand will continue for tactical manned aircraft in the post-JSF timeframe. In their eyes, crucial skills and technologies could thus be lost by concentrating only on unmanned aircraft design, possibly causing U.S. dominance in tactical aircraft design to wane. These proponents point out that UAS have been around for almost a century, yet only recently became operationally effective, and are not likely to replace manned aircraft in the near future.
The future is NOT overrated. What is overrated is the RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT of Artificial Intelligence. It will take a long time before these UAVs become REAL smart, and before that these UAS are more of a remotely piloted, planes. And for Global Hawk alike, it’s a PRE-PROGRAMMED low low orbit satellite.
One survey finds that in 2011, there are 680 different UAS programs worldwide, up from 195 in 2005. Another estimates that global UAS expenditures will double from $1.7 billion in 2011 to $3.5 billion in 2020. The global market for combat aircraft alone, at approximately $15.8 billion in 2011, dwarfs the UAS market. But the rate of growth is projected to be much slower, peaking at approximately $21 billion in 2017, and dropping to approximately $19 billion in 2020. Thus, some would argue that much new business is likely to be generated in the UAS market, and if U.S. companies fail to capture this market share, European, Russian, Israeli, Chinese, or South African(EXO ME???) companies will. From this perspective, capturing this new business, and nurturing industrial expertise in UAS challenge areas (e.g., autonomous flight, control of multiple vehicles, command and control, communications bandwidth) would be an effective way to keep U.S. industry competitive and healthy.
任何一个开放或者半开放的技术行业，竞争都是极其激烈甚至于惨烈的。很典 型的一个例子就是无人机。民用无人机这一块的蛋糕已经被细分的差不多了， 剩下的就是行业应用方向了——包括军队跟警察。
As U.S. companies compete for business in a growing international UAS marketplace, concerns about the proliferation of these systems may grow. Are steps required—and if so, what might they be—to control the spread of UAS? As part of its defense and foreign policy oversight, Congress may examine whether a balance must be struck between supporting legitimate U.S. exports and curbing the spread of UAS technologies to dangerous groups or countries.
Should Congress increase, reduce, or approve DOD’s proposed overall funding level for UAS?
If funding constraints require choices to be made among DOD UAS programs, what are some of the key potential choices? Choices may include whether to reduce the number of UAS programs, buy fewer UAS overall, defer purchase of more sophisticated UAS, or other choices.
Measures of Effectiveness
How should the effectiveness of UAS be evaluated? Number of aircraft procured? Number of UAS tracks supported? Area under surveillance by UAS? Suppression or elimination of a particular threat or category of threats?
Pace of Effort
In terms of developing, procuring, and integrating UAS into their operations, are DOD and the services moving too slowly, too quickly, or at about the right speed? Are the services adequately implementing their UAS road maps? Should the current requirement for issuing road maps every two years be changed, and if so, how? Can a standard metric be established to determine the optimal pace?
Air Force Chief of Staff General Norton Schwartz made the case that “Ideally, what you want to do is have the U.S. government together in a way that allows us to get the best capability…. An example is BAMS and Global Hawk. Why should the Navy and Air Force have two separate depots, ground stations and training pipelines for what is essentially the same airplane with a different sensor? I think there is lots of opportunity for both of us to make better uses of resources.”
For some REAL issues, please do not forget to ask the good old WHY question. WHY? 因为美国也要解决就业问题，解决将军、上将之流的关系户 啊。就是条狗，也要弄成当警犬。
Are current service policies regarding who can operate a UAS satisfactory? If not, how should they be changed? Should there be a uniform, DOD-wide policy? Should DOD consider using a mix of uniformed and civilian personnel for operating UAS, particularly those that are not used for firing weapons (somewhat similar to how Military Sealift Command ships are operated by a mix of uniformed and civilian personnel)? What would be the potential advantages and disadvantages of such an arrangement for operating UAS? What is an appropriate role for contractors in operating military UAS?
What new UAS capabilities are most needed? Should priority be given to incremental increases in capability versus ambitious technological leaps? What is the importance of maintaining the U.S. technological lead in UAS?
做技术，我的看法还是踏踏实实，一步一个脚印的去做。预先研发不是没有必 要，而是技术这个东西，加上工业实践是一个投入相当大的行当。不像卖逼， 脱了裤子就能卖。造人，脱了裤子就能造人。新技术的研发必须要紧跟时代的 脚步，也要看那么一点经济的效益在里面。毕竟22世纪是生物的世纪。
Are current FAA limits on DOD access to domestic U.S. flight facilities for developing UAS hindering the development of DOD UAS? What are the relevant factors and capabilities involved, and do they make a persuasive case for the change or retention of current limits?
Investment priorities could change as the introduction of UAS into the U.S. inventory shifts the balance between manned and unmanned capabilities. Congress, as part of its defense oversight responsibilities, may assess DOD’s current UAS efforts to verify that they match up with new investment goals and strategies. Conventional wisdom states that UAS are cheap, or cost- effective. Is this true today? How do UAS costs compare to manned aircraft costs?
They are not true. That’s why a smarter investment strategy should be deployed. OR our taxpayers’ money will be WASTED.
UAS have traditionally been used for reconnaissance and surveillance, but today they are being employed in roles and applications that their designers never envisioned(NEVER, EVER!!!). The unanticipated flexibility and capability of UAS have led some analysts to suggest that more, if not most, of the missions currently undertaken by manned aircraft could be turned over to unmanned aerial platforms, and that manned and unmanned aircraft could operate together. Future Congresses may have to contemplate the replacement of a significant portion of the manned aircraft fleet with unmanned aircraft.
Current Major DOD UAS Programs
This section addresses the program status and funding of some of the most prominent UAS programs being pursued by DOD, and most likely to compete for congressional attention. This section does not attempt to provide a comprehensive survey of all UAS programs, nor to develop a classification system for different types of UAS (e.g., operational vs. developmental, single mission vs. multi mission, long range vs. short range). One exception is a short subsection below titled “Small UAVs.” The UAVs described in this section are distinguished from the proceeding UAVs by being man-portable and of short range and loiter time. These smaller UAVs are not currently, and are unlikely to be, weaponized. The services do not provide as detailed cost and budget documentation for these UAVs as they do for major UAS programs. Individually, these UAVs appear very popular with ground forces, yet do not necessarily demand as much congressional attention as larger UAS programs like Predator or Global Hawk. As a whole, however, these small, man-portable UAVs appear likely to increasingly compete with major UAS programs for congressional attention and funding.
Through its high-profile use in Iraq and Afghanistan and its multi-mission capabilities, the MQ-1 Predator has become the Department of Defense’s most recognizable UAS. Developed by General Atomics Aeronautical Systems in San Diego, CA, the Predator has helped to define the modern role of UAS with its integrated surveillance payload and armament capabilities. Consequently, Predator has enjoyed accelerated development schedules as well as increased procurement funding. The wide employment of the MQ-1 has also facilitated the development of other closely related UAS (described below) designed for a variety of missions.
System Characteristics. Predator is a medium-altitude, long-endurance UAS. At 27 feet long, 7 feet high and with a 48-foot wingspan, it has long, thin wings and a tail like an inverted “V.” The Predator typically operates at 10,000 to 15,000 feet to get the best imagery from its video cameras, although it has the ability to reach a maximum altitude of 25,000 feet. Each vehicle can remain on station, over 500 nautical miles away from its base, for 24 hours before returning home. The Air Force’s Predator fleet is operated by the 15 th and 17 th Reconnaissance Squadrons out of Creech Air Force Base, NV; the 11 th Reconnaissance Squadron provides training. A second control station has been established at Whiteman AFB, MO. 104 Further, “[t]here are plans to set up Predator operations at bases in Arizona, California, New York, North Dakota, and Texas.” The Air Force has about 175 Predators; the CIA reportedly owns and operates several Predators as well.
Mission and Payload. The Predator’s primary function is reconnaissance and target acquisition of potential ground targets. To accomplish this mission, the Predator is outfitted with a 450-lb surveillance payload, which includes two electro-optical (E-O) cameras and one infrared (IR) camera for use at night. These cameras are housed in a ball-shaped turret that can be easily seen underneath the vehicle’s nose. The Predator is also equipped with a Multi-Spectral Targeting System (MTS) sensor ball which adds a laser designator to the E-O/IR payload that allows the Predator to track moving targets. Additionally, the Predator’s payload includes a synthetic aperture radar (SAR), which enables the UAS to “see” through inclement weather. The Predator’s satellite communications provide for beyond line-of-sight operations. In 2001, as a secondary function, the Predator was outfitted with the ability to carry two Hellfire missiles. Previously, the Predator identified a target and relayed the coordinates to a manned aircraft, which then engaged the target. The addition of this anti-tank ordnance enables the UAS to launch a precision attack on a time sensitive target with a minimized “sensor-to-shoot” time cycle. Consequently, the Air Force changed the Predator’s military designation from RQ-1B (reconnaissance unmanned) to the MQ-1 (multi-mission unmanned). The air vehicle launches and lands like a regular aircraft, but is controlled by a pilot on the ground using a joystick.
The MQ-9 Reaper, formerly the “Predator B,” is General Atomics’ follow-on to the MQ-1. The Reaper is a medium- to high-altitude, long-endurance Predator optimized for surveillance, target acquisition, and armed engagement. While the Reaper borrows from the overall design of the Predator, the Reaper is 13 feet longer and carries a 16-foot-longer wingspan. It also features a 900 hp turboprop engine, which is significantly more powerful than the Predator’s 115 hp engine. These upgrades allow the Reaper to reach a maximum altitude of 50,000 feet, a maximum speed of 225 knots, a maximum endurance of 32 hours, and a maximum range of 2,000 nautical miles. However, the feature that most differentiates Reaper from its predecessor is its ordnance capacity. While the Predator is outfitted to carry 2 100-pound Hellfire missiles, the Reaper now can carry as many as 16 Hellfires, equivalent to the Army’s Apache helicopter, or a mix of 500- pound weapons and Small Diameter Bombs.
Program Status. Predator–family UAS are operated as part of a system, which consists of four air vehicles, a ground control station, and a primary satellite link. The unit cost in FY2009 for one Predator system was approximately $20 million, while the average procurement unit cost for a Reaper system was $26.8 million.
RQ-4 Global Hawk
Northrop Grumman’s RQ-4 Global Hawk has gained distinction as the largest and most expensive UAS currently in operation for the Department of Defense. Global Hawk incorporates a diverse surveillance payload with performance capabilities that rival or exceed most manned spy planes. However, Pentagon officials and Members of Congress have become increasingly concerned with the program’s burgeoning cost, which resulted in Nunn-McCurdy breaches in April 2005 and April 2011. Also, the RQ-4B Block 30 was deemed “not operationally suitable” due to “low air vehicle reliability” by the office of Operational Test and Evaluation in May 2011.
System Characteristics.At 44 feet long and weighing 26,750 lbs, Global Hawk is about as large as a medium sized corporate jet. Global Hawk flies at nearly twice the altitude of commercial airliners and can stay aloft at 65,000 feet for as long as 35 hours. It can fly to a target area 5,400 nautical miles away, loiter at 60,000 feet while monitoring an area the size of the state of Illinois for 24 hours, and then return. Global Hawk was originally designed to be an autonomous drone capable of taking off, flying, and landing on pre-programmed inputs to the UAV’s flight computer. Air Force operators have found, however, that the UAS requires frequent intervention by remote operators. The RQ-4B resembles the RQ-4A, yet features a significantly larger airframe. In designing the B-model, Northrop Grumman increased the Global Hawk’s length from 44 feet to 48 feet and its wingspan from 116 feet to 132 feet. The expanded size enables the RQ- 4B to carry an extra 1000 pounds of surveillance payload.
Frequent intervention, namely, it’s not a smart (automatic) stuff. It’s as dummy as fuck.
Mission and Payload. The Global Hawk UAS has been called “the theater commander’s around- the-clock, low-hanging (surveillance) satellite.” The UAS provides a long-dwell presence over the battlespace, giving military commanders a persistent source of high-quality imagery that has proven valuable in surveillance and interdiction operations. The RQ-4A’s current imagery payload consists of a 2,000-lb integrated suite of sensors much larger than those found on the Predator. These sensors include an all-weather SAR with Moving Target Indicator (MTI) capability, an E-O digital camera and an IR sensor. As the result of a January 2002 Air Force requirements summit, Northrop Grumman expanded its payload to make it a multi-intelligence air vehicle. The subsequent incarnation, the RQ-4B, is outfitted with an open-system architecture that enables the vehicle to carry multiple payloads, such as signals intelligence (SIGINT) and electronic intelligence (ELINT) sensors. Furthermore, the classified Multi-Platform Radar Technology Insertion Program (MP-RTIP) payload will be added in order to increase radar capabilities. These new sensor packages will enable operators to eavesdrop on radio transmissions or to identify enemy radar from extremely high altitudes. Future plans include adding hyper-spectral sensors for increased imagery precision and incorporating laser communications to expand information transfer capabilities. The end goal is to field a UAS that will work with space-based sensors to create a “staring net” that will prevent enemies from establishing a tactical surprise. In August 2003, the Federal Aviation Administration granted the Global Hawk authorization to fly in U.S. civilian airspace, which further expanded the system’s mission potential. This distinction, in combination with the diverse surveillance capabilities, has led many officials outside the Pentagon to consider the Global Hawk an attractive candidate for anti-drug smuggling and Coast Guard operations.
在中特帝面前，美利坚人民一点隐私都没有。然鹅康师傅指挥的一系列窃听以 及泄密行为，实在是人神共愤。无人机的行业应用前景是十分美好的，现在问 题的大头就在于稳定性。稳定性 Reliability解决了，一切都好说话。
Program Status. Developed by Northrop Grumman Corporation of Palmdale, CA, Global Hawk entered low-rate initial production in February 2002. The Air Force has stated that it intends to acquire 51 Global Hawks, at an expected cost of $6.6 billion for development and procurement costs. As of November 2009, the Air Force possessed 7 RQ-4As and 3 RQ-4Bs. Another 32 Global Hawks had been authorized and appropriated through FY2011. According to the most recent Selected Acquisition Report, the current average procurement unit cost for the Global Hawk has reached $140.9 million in current dollars.
In its markup of the FY2011 defense authorization bill, the House Armed Services Committee expressed concern “that differing, evolving service unique requirements, coupled with Global Hawk UAS vanishing vendor issues, are resulting in a divergence in each service’s basic goal of maximum system commonality and interoperability, particularly with regard to the communications systems.” The bill report directs the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics to certify and provide written notification to the congressional defense committees by March 31, 2011, that he has reviewed the communications requirements and acquisition strategies for both Global Hawk and BAMS. The subcommittee wants assurance that the requirements for each service’s communications systems have been validated and that the acquisition strategy for each system “achieves the greatest possible (DOD: ???) commonality and represents the most cost effective option” for each program.
你们以为现在美帝的工业化水平很高吗？Naive.要不是先发制人100多年，现 在早就被中特帝给按在马桶里面吃屎了。吃屎啦梁非凡！ Particularly with regard to the
The Navy’s Broad Area Maritime Surveillance system is based on the Global Hawk Block 20 airframe but with significantly different sensors from its Air Force kin. This, coupled with a smaller fleet size, results in a higher unit cost. “The air service’s drone costs $27.6 million per copy, compared to an expected $55 million per BAMS UAV, including its sensors and communications suite…. At 68 aircraft, the BAMS fleet will be the world’s largest purchase of long-endurance marinized UAVs.”
System Characteristics and Mission. “BAMS … provides persistent maritime intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance data collection and dissemination capability to the Maritime Patrol and Reconnaissance Force. The MQ-4C BAMS UAS is a multi-mission system to support strike, signals intelligence, and communications relay as an adjunct to the MMA/P-3 community to enhance manpower, training and maintenance efficiencies worldwide.”
“The RQ-4 … features sensors designed to provide near worldwide coverage through a network of five orbits inside and outside continental United States, with sufficient air vehicles to remain airborne for 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, out to ranges of 2000 nautical miles. Onboard sensors will provide detection, classification, tracking and identification of maritime targets and include maritime radar, electro-optical/infra-red and Electronic Support Measures systems. Additionally, the RQ-4 will have a communications relay capability designed to link dispersed forces in the theater of operations and serve as a node in the Navy’s FORCEnet strategy.
尊严不是无代价的。同理，全球霸主地位的诞生也不是无代价的。你看美利坚 趁着二战之后英国的虚弱， 做了多少天怒人怨，伤天害理的事情。然后呢？ 然后实现了通过经济手段来全世界剪羊毛的“不战而屈人之兵”。然鹅要当新 罗马就也要有心理准备，罗马帝国的丧钟从2008年就开始敲响了。
MQ-8B Fire Scout
Now in deployment, the Fire Scout was initially designed as the Navy’s choice for an unmanned helicopter capable of reconnaissance, situational awareness, and precise targeting. Although the Navy canceled production of the Fire Scout in 2001, Northrop Grumman’s vertical take-off UAV was rejuvenated by the Army in 2003, when the Army designated the Fire Scout as the interim Class IV UAV for the future combat system. The Army’s interest spurred renewed Navy funding for the MQ-8, making the Fire Scout DOD’s first joint UAS helicopter.
System Characteristics and Mission. Northrop Grumman based the design of the Fire Scout on a commercial helicopter. The RQ-8B model added a four-blade rotor to reduce the aircraft’s acoustic signature. With a basic 127-pound payload, the Fire Scout can stay aloft for up to 9.5 hours; with the full-capacity sensor payload, endurance diminishes to roughly 6 hours. Fire Scout possesses autonomous flight capabilities. The surveillance payload consists of a laser designator and range finder, an IR camera and a multi-color EO camera, which when adjusted with specific filters could provide mine-detection capabilities. Fire Scout also currently possesses line-of- sight communication data links. Initial tests of an armed Fire Scout were conducted in 2005, and the Navy expects to add “either Raytheon’s Griffin or BAE’s Advanced Precision Kill Weapon System” small missiles to currently deployed Fire Scouts soon. Discussions of future missions have also covered border patrol, search and rescue operations, medical resupply, and submarine spotting operations.
Fire Scout can fly for 8 hours with a maximum range of 618 nautical miles? Well, Fire-X will fly for 15, with a max range of 1227. Fire Scout tops out at 100 knots? Fire-X can speed by at 140. Fire-X will carry a load of 3200 lbs. to Fire Scout’s 1242. All this talk from a drone helicopter that just took its first flight in December…. Fire-X isn’t going to be a big departure from Fire Scout, though. The BRITE STAR II and other radars will remain on board, as will its software for relaying information to a ship.
Although publicly acknowledged to exist, most information about the Lockheed Martin RQ-170 Sentinel is classified. First photographed in the skies over Afghanistan, but also reportedly in operation from South Korea, 150 the RQ-170 is a tailless “flying wing” stealthier than other current U.S. UAS. An RQ-170 was reported to have performed surveillance and data relay related to the operation against Osama bin Laden’s compound on May 1, 2011. The government of Iran claimed on December 2, 2011, to be in possession of an intact RQ-170 following its incursion into Iranian airspace.
Other Current UAS Programs
RQ-5A Hunter/MQ-5B Hunter II
Originally co-developed by Israel Aircraft Industries and TRW (now owned by Northrop Grumman) for a joint U.S. Army/Navy/Marine Corps short-range UAS, the Hunter system found a home as one of the Army’s principal unmanned platforms. The service has deployed the RQ-5A for tactical ISR in support of numerous ground operations around the world. At one time, the Army planned to acquire 52 Hunter integrated systems of eight air vehicles apiece, but the Hunter program experienced some turbulence. The Army canceled full-rate production of the RQ-5A in 1996, but continued to use the seven systems already produced. It acquired 18 MQ-5B Hunter IIs through low-rate initial production in FY2004 and FY2005. The MQ-5B’s design includes longer endurance and the capability to be outfitted with anti-tank munitions. Both variants are currently operated by the 224 th Military Intelligence Battalion out of Fort Stewart, GA; by the 15 th Military Intelligence Battalion out of Ft. Hood, TX; and by 1 st Military Intelligence Battalion out of Hohenfels, Germany.
中国的无人机技术能有今天，一个非常需要感谢的国家就是以色列了。没有以 色列政府有偿/无偿的援助，几乎不可能有中国无人机工业的快速发展。（有 机会可以搜一下这方面的资料。
System Characteristics. The RQ-5A can fly at altitudes up to 15,000 feet, reach speeds of 106 knots, and spend up to 12 hours in the air. Weighing 1,600 pounds, it has an operating radius of 144 nautical miles. The MQ-5B includes an elongated wingspan of 34.3 feet up from 29.2 feet of the RQ-5A and a more powerful engine, which allows the Hunter II to stay airborne for three extra hours and to reach altitudes of 18,000 feet. The Hunter system consists of eight aircraft, ground control systems and support devices, and launch/recovery equipment. In FY2004, the final year of Hunter procurement, a Hunter system cost $26.5 million.
The RQ-7 Shadow found a home when the Army, after a two-decade search for a suitable system, selected AAI’s close range surveillance platform for its tactical unmanned aerial vehicle (TUAV) program. Originally, the Army, in conjunction with the Navy explored several different UAVs for the TUAV program, including the now-cancelled RQ-6 Outrider system. However, in 1997, after the Navy pursued other alternatives, the Army opted for the low-cost, simple design of the RQ-7 Shadow 200. Having reached full production capacity and an IOC in 2002, the Shadow has become the primary airborne ISR tool of numerous Army units around the world and is expected to remain in service through the decade.
System Characteristics. Built by AAI Corporation (now owned by Textron), the Shadow is 11 feet long with a wingspan of 13 feet. It has a range of 68 nautical miles, a distance picked to match typical Army brigade operations, and average flight duration of five hours. Although the Shadow can reach a maximum altitude of 14,000 feet, its optimum level is 8,000 feet. The Shadow is catapulted from a rail-launcher, and recovered with the aid of arresting gear. The UAS also possesses automatic takeoff and landing capabilities. The upgraded version, the RQ-7B Shadow, features a 16-inch greater wingspan and larger fuel capacity, allowing for an extra two hours of flight endurance.
Mission and Payload. The Shadow provides real-time reconnaissance, surveillance, and target acquisition information to the Army at the brigade level. A potential mission for the Shadow is the perilous job of medical resupply. The Army is considering expanding the UAS’s traditional missions to include a medical role, where several crucial items such as blood, vaccines, and fluid infusion systems could be delivered to troops via parachute. For surveillance purposes, the Shadow’s 60-pound payload consists of an E-O/IR sensor turret, which produces day or night video and can relay data to a ground station in real-time via a line-of-sight data link. As part of the Army’s Future Combat System plans, the Shadow will be outfitted with the Tactical Common Data Link currently in development to network the UAS with battalion commanders, ground units, and other air vehicles. The Marine Corps is considering how to arm Shadow.